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FOREWORD
This report describes the results of the Hydrogen Detection Study
performed under NASA Contract NAS2-6478 by Life Systems, Inc.
during the period January 1, 1974 through September 30, 1974.
The Program Manager at Life Systems was F. H. Schubert, with
support provided by J. D. Powell and G. D. Kostell in electrical
engineering, J. W. Shumar in Product Assurance, F. C. Jensen in
mechanical engineering, and J. J. Palagyi in sensor evaluation
testing.
The technical management of the program was under the direction
of Mr. P. D.'Quattrone, Chief, Environmental Control Research
Branch, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California.
Life SYst&M, AHc.
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SUMMARY
A study was performed to assess the effectiveness of a hydrogen (H2) detection
concept for regenerative Environmental Control/Life Support Systems.(EC/LSS).
The concept evaluated was that utilized for the Electrochemical Depolarized
Concentrator (EDC) designed, constructed, and tested under NASA Contract NAS2-
6478 for the EC/LSS Space Station Prototype (SSP) program. The EDC contains
Combustible Gas Detectors (CGDs) which, for this study, were evaluated with H2.The CGDs were evaluated for linearity, position sensitivity, reproducibility,
ambient effects, repeatability, speed of response, recovery time, and interchange-
ability. The effectiveness of CGDs located within the EDC for sensing H2 leaks
at various Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) in the subsystem was determined. The
effects of H leak rate, H2 concentration of leaking gas and air currents in the
vicinity of ihe EDC were determined. Proposed improvements for the H2 detection
concept were documented. and alternative H2 -detection approaches were identified
and analyzed.
INTRODUCTION
Space vehicles for future extended-duration manned spaceflight will require
regenerative Environmental Control/Life Support Systems (EC/LSS). Many subsystems
currently being developed to make up the EC/LSS utilize or produce hydrogen (H )
gas. Some of these subsystems are: the Water Electrolysis Subsystem (WES) (1)
whichg nerates breathable oxygen (O ) and produces the by-product H2; the
Bosch or Sabatier Carbon Dioxide (C02) Reduction Subsystems which use H2in the process of ' penerating 2 from CO2; the Electrochemical Depolarized
Concentrator (EDC) which uses H^ to depolarize the.anode in the process of
removin 5 C02 from the cabin-atmospiere; and the Nitrogen (N ) Generating Sub-
system which use hydrazine (N2H4 ) or ammonia (NH3) as tie primary N2 source
with H2 as the by-product.
In addition to those subsystems in the EC/LSS that utilize H , NASA Modular
Space Station (MSS) design studies have i uded the use of 2 in the Electrical
Power System and Reaction Control System. The energy storage assembly of the
Electrical Power System uses regenerative H2 -O2 fuel cells. The Reaction
Control System uses H2 and 02 for the engines. This study, therefore, although
focused on only one subsystem of the EC/LSS has application to three other
subsystems of the EC/LSS and. to hardware that makes up the Electrical Power and
Reaction Control Systems of a space vehicle.
The Space Station Prototype (SSP) program sponsored by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration Johnson Spacecraft Center (NASA JSC) involved the
design, development,, fabrication, and assembly of an advanced EC/LSS. The SSP
EC/LSS includes three subsystems which produce or utilize H2: an 02 Generating
Subsystem, an EDC, and a Sabatier-based CO2 Reduction Subsystem.
The H2 gas molecule being small and highly mobile can leak through air-tight
seals. If it leaks into confined spaces or is permitted to accumulate, it can
produce a combustible gas mixture. Prevention of these situations by incorpor-
ating H2 safety design criteria is mandatory. Hence, a definite requirement for
future space vehicles is to sense automatically for the presence of H so that
corrective measures can be taken before the crew would be exposed to ianger.
(1) References cited are on page 41. 1
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H2 Detection Principles
There are several principles of H2 detection based upon the unique properties of
H2 gas. These principles include: the catalytic combustibility of H , the
exothermic absorption of H by certain materials, the thermal conductivity of H2
mixtures, and the electrociemical oxidation of H2.
Combustibility
In using the combustibility of H2 gas, a catalyzed hot wire or heated thermistor
forms one leg of a Wheatstone bridge arrangement. Combustion of H2 at the
surface of the sensing element causes a temperature increase above that of a
reference element, resulting in a change in the resistance of the sensing
element and an unbalance in the Wheatstone bridge. The magnitude of the unbalance
is calibrated to yield the concentration of the H2 gas.
Thermal Conductivity
Thermal conductivity detectors are based upon the principle that a heated filament
(resistor) will be cooled by a gas sample according to the thermal conductivity
of the gas. This sensor consists of two (2) chambers, each containing identical
heated resistors which form adjacent branches of a Wheatstone bridge. One
chamber (the sample chamber) contains the gas to be analyzed and the other
chamber (a comparison or reference chamber) contains the reference gas. If the
atmosphere does not'contain H2 gas, the equilibrium temperature of both resistors
is the same because the heating current is the same. When the sample gas contains
H , however, the heat loss differs. This changes the equilibrium temperature of
tie sample chamber resistor in proportion to the inverse of the thermal conduc-
tivity of the gas. This changes its resistance which results in an output
signal from the Wheatstone bridge circuit that can be calibrated to reflect the
concentration of H2 in the sample gas.
Exothermic Absorption
Three types of H2 sensors are based upon the effects of the absorption of H2 on
palladium (Pd). One sensor is based on the exothermic absorption of H2 molecules
by Pd which, in the presence of 0 , is immediately followed by an even more
exothermic formation of water. iie heat from this reaction can be used to
indicate the presence of H2 by using Pd or a similar catalytic material in
conjunction with the Wheatstone bridge arrangement similar to that y Td in the
catalytic combustion sensor previously discussed. A second sensor, based on
Pd absorption uses the heat from the Pd-H2 and hydride-O2 reactions to change
the color of a thermochromic paint. The sensor is constructed in two layers,
one layer containing Pd, the other a chromic paint. Hydrogen passing into the
sensor eacts with the Pd, creates the heat and changes the color of the paint,
thus ving an indication of H, presence. The third sensor, based on Pd absorp-
tion relies .on a temperature controlled element composed of a thin film of Pd
metal. The electrical conductance of this thin film is a function of the
partial pressure of H2 concentration in the sample gas.
2
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Electrochemical Oxidation
A sensor, based on the electrochemical oxidation of H2(9) consists of a pair of
electrodes and an electrolyte gel. A gas permeable membrane fits firmly against
the anode of the electrochemical cell. As H2 passes through the membrane, it is
electrolytically oxidized at the anode and current flows between the electrodes.
The current flow is a function of the H2 concentration of the sampled gas.
Miscellaneous Principles
Another H2 sensor that is being developed is based on the emission oC1 Kfypton 85
from the surface of kryptonated metal oxides when exposed to H2 gas. Another
H2 sensor is based upon the fuel cell principle in which the concentration of H
in the sample gas is determined by the magnitude of the cell current of the (f
cell. A general review of additional methods of H2 detection are discussed
and may be referred to for additional information.
Bas 2 n the criteria for the selection of subsystems and onents for the
SSP and based upon the results of a NASA-funded study, in which a critical
review of H2 detection literature was performed and an evaluation of the state-
of-the-art of detecting H2 fires and leaks was made, a CGD based on the catalytic
combustion H2 detection principle, was selected for the EDC.
The SSP program H detection philosophy was based upon strategically locating
the CGDs and estaBlishing H2 concentration shutdown levels that would permit the
execution of safety operations before hazardous conditions were reached. The
objective of this study was to characterize the H2 detection concept as used in
the EDC developed for the SSP and to identify alternate H detection approaches
which would be more effective and applicable to future EChLSS.
The study involved the evaluation of the CGD in regard to its linearity, position
sensitivity, reproducibility, ambient effects, repeatability, speed of response,
recovery time and interchangeability. It also included evaluating the effective-
ness of the CGDs for sensing H2 leaks in the EDC, recommending possible improve-
ments for the H2 detection concept, and suggesting alternate H2 detection approaches
for EC/LSS subsystems.
DISCUSSION
SSP H2 Detection Philosophy
The SSP program established a H2 detection philosophy based upon strategically
locating CGDs on each subsystem of the EC/LSS. The strategy involved in defining
sensor location consisted of evaluating each subsystem for possible H2 leak
sources, areas of stagnation and possible H2 accumulation areas. The output of
each sensor is continuously monitored and, if any one indicates H -in-air concen-
trations 0.5% or greater, subsystem shutdown would be initiated. The SSP H2
detection philosophy and H2 safety precautions are further defined by twelve SSP
H2 leakage rules. These are listed in Table 1. Based on the guidelines of the
twelve H2 leakage rules and the results of the January 16-18, 1973 Approval
3
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TABLE 1 SSP HYDROGEN LEAKAGE RULES
1. Each of the H -containing subsystems will be built as a ventilated
structure, wiih no enclosures for concentrating H2 except those
components and lines which must contain H2 in order to perform the
principal function of the subsystem.
2. All H -containing elements of each subsystem are subject to constant
ventilation at a minimum flow of 25 ft/min by circulation of cabin air.
3. Each subsystem, in each distinct test and/or installation configuration,
will be explored for stagnation areas where mixing is not constant.
4. No stagnation area which may be subject to H2 infringement from a leak
source will be allowed unless specifically approved by the Engineering
Manager and the Safety Specialist.
5. Combustible gas detectors will be mounted as follows:
a. In stagnation areas and accumulation locations on each subsystem.
b. Adjacent to the most probable one or two areas of leakage of H2 in
each subsystem.
c. In a location to monitor the main flow path of the cabin air.
6. Combustible gas detectors shall give the shutdown signal at 0.5% H2 con-
centration, and shutdown of H -containing subsystems should be complete
(including purge) before the concentration reaches 2%.
7. Combustible gas detectors should give notice to crew at about 0.2% H2
concentration.
8. There should be capability for monitoring any selected combustible gas
detector and for identifying that detector which caused a notice or
shutdown.
9. There should be capability for identifying any one subsystem which is
leaking H2 , upon receipt of a notice; in order to permit minimum shutdown.
10. Hydrogen-containing subsystems shall all be shut down and purged if the
circulation of cabin air fails.
11. Physical arrangement of H2-containing components and lines should ensure
that there is no ignition source within 1 feet of any possible source of
H2 leakage unless there is intervening shielding.
12. No repairing or disconnecting of any H2-containing component or line
shall be allowed without first shutting down and purging the subsystem.
4
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Design Review, (1 4 ) the CGDs for the EDC were located as shown in Figures 1 and
2, the front and rear view of the EDC, respectively.
Combustible Gas Detectors, SSP Item Nos. 178-03 and 178-37, are located on the
front of the EDC and serve to monitor for possible H2 leaks from the electro-
chemical module connections and the electrochemical module gasket and O-ring
seals.
Combustible Gas Detectors, SSP Item Nos. 178-01.and 178-02, are located'on the
rear panel of the CS-6 and in this location monitor for possible leaks from all.
H 2-bearing Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) located on the back panel. After a H2leak has been sensed the subsystem is shut down and N2-purged. The leaking com-
ponent is isolated utilizing an appropriate leak detector.
SSP Combustible Gas Detector
The SSP Item No. 178 CGD is a catalytic combustion.type CGD modified by the SSP
program's prime contractor for incorporation into the EC/LSS. The modifications
included:
1. Removing all alarm circuits.
2. Changing the sensor output from 0-1 volts to 0-5 volts.
3. Repackaging to satisfy the maintainability requirements of the SSP. (12 )
The Item No. 178 CGD is shown in Figure 3. In operation for H2 detection, the
H2 air mixtures diffuse through the flame arrestors and:the H2 gas oxidizes on a
catalytically-treated sensing bead causing a change in temperature and electrical
resistance in proportion to the H2 gas/air ratio. A reference bead is also in-
cluded to compensate for ambient temperature variations, humidity changes and
pressure differences. The reference bead is inert to H . The difference in
resistance of the active and reference beads is convertd into the sensor output
signal by electronic conditioning circuits. The sensor output is a 0 to 5 volt
DC signal which represents 0 to 4% H 2-in-air mixtures. 'The crew warning signal
and subsystem shutdown signal according to the SSP H2 leakage rules were intended
to be manually set at 0.2% H -in-air and 0.5% H -in-air, respectively, in the
Acceptance Checkout Equipmeni (ACE) computer ani the subsystemls controllers.
This corresponds to output voltages of 0.25V and 0.62V. The specification for
the SSP Item No. 178 CGD is listed in Table 2.
Evaluation of SSP Combustible Gas Detector
Several experiments were performed to determine the operating characteristics of
the SSP Item No. 178 CGD. The CGDs were evaluated for linearity, position
sensitivity, reproducibility, ambient effects, repeatability, speed of response,
recovery time, interchangeability, and their ability to detect H leaks on the
EDC.
Linearity
In order to facilitate CGD calibration and to assure maximum safety it is important
that the CGD response be linear. A linear response would insure an accurate H2-
5
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Data Acquisition
Lead Transistor 'Ut 970-4
Mounting iCGD Electronics
876-31
-178-37
-178-03
Electrical Shutoff Process Air Blower,
Valve
---- 543-32
305-34---- 543-31
305-33
305-35-,
CGD Sensor Head
178-37--
0"
*
178-03--
Electrochemical Module, Process Air Sensor,
890-31,-32,--33- 875-31
890-34,-35,-36--\ 875-32
Primary Controller,
871-31--- 
rA
Emergency Controller,
872-31
FIGURE 1 CS-6 FRONT VIEW
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Cooling Air Blower
,,o- 345-32
345-31
CGD Sensor Head
Electrical Shutoff
Valves 178-01
306-30
306-08
Electrical Shutoff
Valves
H Flow Sensor &
Distribution Mounting
882-31 306-38
882-32
Electrical Shutoff
Valves Backpressure
Regulator
306-07 '
306-39- 310-32
CGD Electronics Pressure Sensor
178-01 "--"" 
-877-31
178-02 - ""-877-33
Manual Shutoff Valve
FIGURE 2 CS-6 REAR VIEW
7
Combustible Gas Sensor
(Electronics and
Sen or Head)
FIGURE 3 COMBUSTIBLE GAS DETECTOR
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TABLE 2 COMBUSTIBLE GAS DETECTOR SPECIFICATION
/ Syst C. SPECIFICATION NO. 178 LTR. A
DATECLEVELAND, OHIO 44122 LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT PAGE 1 OF 2 2/6/74
TITLE DETECTOR, COMBUSTIBLE GAS PART DRAWING NO. 436
FUNCTION:
The combustible gas detector monitors the percentage of H2 in air.
DESCRIPTION:
Hydrogen/air mixture, diffusing through flame arrestors, oxidizes on a catalyti-
cally treated sensing bead, causing a change in temperature and electrical re-
sistance in proportion to the H2/air ratio. A reference bead, inert to combus-
tible gases compensates for ambient temperature variations, humidity changes,
and pressure differences. The differences in resistance of the active and refer-
ence beads are converted to sensor signals.
DESIGN DATA:
Performance Characteristics
Sensor
Ambient temperature range 
-65 to 200F
Response <1 second (H2 )Drift <5%/year
H2 concentration range 0-4%
Controller
Ambient temperature range 
-40 to 150F
Repeatability t2% full scale
Reliability data
Failure rate 5.0 x 10 6 failures/hr
MTBF 0.2 x 106 hr
Spares 3 (180-mission profile)
Physical Characteristics
Sensor
Weight 1.06 lb
Volume 0.00511 ft3
Basic Configuration 1.5 in dia x 5 in long
Controller
Weight 2.81 lb
Volume 0.0441 ft3
Basic Configuration 2.25 x 4.13 x 8.20 in
Material Characteristics
A. Nonmetallic
TFE (Teflon), G-10 (Epoxy), Melamine, 1663 Potting Compound (3M),
Stycast 2651 mm, (Epoxy), Ceramic, Kynar
continued-
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Table 2 - continued
8e St AMc NUMBER 178 REVISION LETTER PAGE
5/1/ b.'fl&~tWs W, A178
CLEVELAND. OHIO 44122 2
B. Metallic
Aluminum, Sintered Stainless Steel, Sintered Bronze
Electrical Characteristics
Input voltage 106-122 VAC, 400 hz
Controller output voltage 0-5 VDC
INTERFACES:
Mechanical Two sensors are mounted above the
module H2 connections. Two sensors
are mounted above the CS-6 H2 valves.(No. 306)
Electrical
Controller connectors Deutsch AFDSO-10-6PN-1A
Deutsch AFDSO-10-6PW-1A
Sensor connector Deutsch AFDS6-10-65W-1A
Mounting
Sensor Via two Deutsch captive fasteners
Electronics package Via two Deutsch captive fasteners
ENVIRONMENT:
Cabin atmosphere
MAINTENANCE LEVEL AND METHOD:
Replacement of this Line Replaceable Unit is the first level of maintenance.
Time Required: 0.1 hour
10
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in-air indication over the entire range of possible H2 concentrations without
extensive and difficult calibrations.
In order to determine the linearity of the CGDs an environmental chamber was
constructed. This chamber is shown in Figure 4. The CGDs were then calibrated
by alternately exposing them to N2 and a 1.9% H 2-in-air calibration gas mixture
and making the appropriate zero and span adjustments. Once calibration was
completed the CGD output was recorded for the calibration gases and an additional
H2-in-air gas mixture between the calibration points.
The results of this task are presented both graphically and in tabular form in
Figure 5. Observation of the data reveals that the detectors are nonlinear over
the entire range of H2 concentrations and also reveals that each sensor departs
from the desired linear response by varying degrees. The difference from the
expected 0.625 volt response for the 0.5% H -in-air concentration is from 0.099
volts for CGD 178-02 to 0.220 volts for CGD 178-01. In all cases, the CGD read
high at the 0.5% H2-in-air concentration. This is good from a safety standpoint
but could cause unwarranted subsystem shutdowns. To use these sensors effectively
in the SSP it will be necessary to perform calibrations at the safety established
H2 concentrations. Per the SSP H2 leakage rules in Table 1, these points are
0.2%, 0.5%, and 2.0% H2-in-air.
The explanation for the observed nonlinearity follows. The catalyzed sensing
bead and uncatalyzed reference bead are semiconductor elements with a small
positive temperature coefficient. The two beads are connected in series and are
powered by a constant current to heat them to about 672K (750F). They are
connected as part of a bridge circuit such that small changes in the ratio of
the resistances of the two beads produce an output which is amplified and
becomes the sensor output signal. For small resistance changes the output will
be a linear function of the resistance change. Nonlinearities in the CGD output
versus H2 percent are probably due to thermal and chemical (i.e., catalyst
degradation) nonlinearities.
Again, the subject CGDs could be used to warn the crew and initiate automatic
subsytem shutdown as long as the warning and shutdown levels correspond to the
calibration points of the CGD. It is anticipated that the precise H2-in-air
concentration in the cabin would be accurately and correctly determined by a gas
chromatograph or other device which could continuously monitor the quality of
the cabin atmosphere for all contaminants.
Position Sensitivity
While working with the EDC it was noted that the CGD output was sensitive to
slight variations in its position relative to horizontal. As a result of this
observation, an experiment was performed to determine the magnitude of the CGD
output variation as a function of the sensor position. The CGD was mounted in
the ambient air and its output was recorded as it was rotated 360 degrees about
its axes.
In one case, the CGD was rotated about an axis perpendicular to the sensor axis
and perpendicular to the "g" vector so that when rotated 90 degrees, the sensor
11
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2.5-
2.0-
S1.5-
1.0-
0 CGD Voltage
o O 178-01 X 178-02 0 178-37 Straight
Atmosphere Reading Error Reading Error Reading Error Line
N 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.0000.5 2
0.5% H2-in-Air 0.845 0.220 0.724 0.099 0.766 0.141 0.625
1.9% H2- in-Air(a) 2.377 0.002 2.376 0.001 2.376 0.001 2.375
(a) Calibration Points
0
0 1.0 2.0
H2-in-Air Concentration, % H2
FIGURE 5 CGD CALIBRATION DATA
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head points down and when rotated 270 degrees, the sensor head points up (see
illustration in Figure 6). In the second case, the CGD was rotated clockwise
about the axis of the sensor head (see illustration in Figure 7).
The results of this experiment are presented graphically in Figures 6 and 7.
Both figures show that the sensors are highly sensitive to orientation varying
by up to 1.9 volts (38% of full scale). It was determined that this dependence
on orientation was created by the fact that the sensing and reference beads in
the sensor are heated. When the sensor is oriented such that the two beads are
in a vertical line (i.e., one right above the other) with the sensing bead over
the reference bead, convective heat transfer will cause the sensing bead to be
hotter than the reference bead. This will unbalance the bridge and provide an
output. If the sensor is rotated 180 degrees to reverse the two beads, the
reference bead will now be hotter than the sensing bead and the output will
decrease.
It should be noted that the effect of heat transfer from one bead to another
will be significantly different in a zero-g environment and shutdown points set
on earth will not remain the same in zero g.
If this CGD were used for actual space flight, it would be imperative to calibrate
the sensor as soon as orbit has been established and prior to activating the
EC/LSS. This, of course, would be an undesirable activity.
Reproducibility
Since effects of variations in the ambient atmosphere influence the CGD output,
it was decided that the best way to characterize the reproducibility of the CGDs
would be to:
1. Determine both the short-term and long-term effect of a constant H2-in-air environment on CGD output.
2. Determine the effect of a constant air flow past the sensor on the CGD
output.
3. Determine the effect of input power on the CGD output voltage.
4. Determine the effect of relative humidity of the H2/air mixture on
sensor output.
5. Determine the repeatability of the CGD output.
Short-Term and Long-Term Exposure to Constant H -in-Air Mixture. A CGD was
mounted in the environmental chamber. The chamber was filled with a H -in-air
gas mixture. In order not to deplete the H2 concentration in the chamer as a
result of- he3catalytic combustion reaction, the chamber was constantly fed with
1.57 x 10 m /s (22cfh) of the gas mixture and the chamber pressure was main-
tained at 1.87 kN/m (7.5 inches of water) above atmospheric. This test was run
for 25 days. The results are presented in Figure 8.
Data indicate that there was a gradual decrease in sensor output as a function
14
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of exposure time to the H2/air mixture. For the first 24 hours CGD output
decreased by 0.060 volts. For the entire test CGD output decreased by 0.500
volts. This corresponds to a change in H2 concentration of 0.4% and an average
8.0 x 10 volt/hour decay rate. At the conclusion of the test, air was admitted
to the chamber. The CGD remained on, exposed to ambient air, for four days.
After this time 2.06% H -in-air was admitted to the chamber and sensor output
recorded. The gas mixiure used was from the same bottle originally put on
stream at 454 hours into the test. The CGD reading peaked and remained at 2.10
volts for three hours after which the test was terminated.
These data indicate that the CGD recovered somewhat as a result of being removed
from the H -in-air environment for the four-day period. The sensor recovered by
0.175 volti but did not reach the CGD output recorded for 2.05% H2-in-air at the
start of the test, 2.50 volts.
It is postulated that the decrease in CGD output could be attributed to either
a loss in the activity of the catalyst due to the constant exposure to H -in-
air or drift in the electronics or to the sensor bead resistance. In any event,
the results of this test point out the need for frequent CGD calibrations.
Exposure to Air Flow. For this test the environmental chamber was modified to
incorporate a blower and a 5.08 cm x 15.24 cm (2 in x 6 in) opening was provided
to allow air to flow by the sensor. The CGD output was recorded as was the air
speed at the chamber exit. The air speed was measured by a Dwyer No. 460 air
meter. The results, presented in Table 3, show that the CGD output remained
essentially constant for 41 hours at the constant air flow of 292 ±13 cm/s (575
±25 ft/min). The maximum variation observed was 0.0035 volts.
At the conclusion of this test, the air speed was varied from 0 to 762 cm/s
(1500 ft/min) and the CGD output was recorded. These data are listed in Table 4
and show a negligible change in CGD output over the entire flow range.
The data gathered from both tests indicate that air flow rate has an insig-
nificant impact on CGD output. There was concern that the air flow would cool
the heated sensing and reference beads in the sensor head and result in a change
in CGD output. This does not occur since the dual flame arrestors (porous metal)
apparently provide for sufficient protection against air currents.
Variation of Input Voltage. Two CGDs were mounted in an air environment and
power to the electronics was supplied through a variable transformer. By manipu-
lating the variable transformer setting the input voltage to the CGD electronics
was varied from 110 to 120 volts. The CGD ouptut voltage was monitored as a
function of the input voltage. The results of this experiment are presented in
Figure 9.
These data indicate that both CGD outputs varied with input voltage and by
different amounts. The greatest variation noted was in sensor 178-01. Its
reading decreased by 34% as the input voltage was increased fr. 5 10 to 120
volts. The SSP voltage specification is 106 to 122 volts rms. Based on
this specification and the data obtained, the CGD output would be expected to
vary by at least as much as 0.08 my. This corresponds to 0.064% H2-in-air.
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TABLE 3 CGD OUTPUT VERSUS TIME
CGD Output,
Time, Hr Volt
0 0.040
3 0.041
12 0.040
22 0.042
24 0.039
36 0.039
41 0.038
TABLE 4 CGD OUTPUT VERSUS AIR SPEED
Air Speed, CGD Output,
Ft/Min Volt
0 0.0389
200 0.0387
500 0.0388
1100 0.0388
1300 0.0387
1500 0.0386
19
to)
0.14 O Atmosphere: Air
0 178-01
0.12 - 178-37
0.10
0
-4
>
0.08
O
8 0.06
0.04
0.02
0 110 115 120
Sensor Input Voltage, Volt
FIGURE 9 SENSOR OUTPUT VERSUS INPUT VOLTAGE
£ifc Systcm, Jnc.
Relative Humidity Variations. In order to determine the effect of the relative
humidity (RH) of the H /air mixture on the CGD output, the test setup shown in
Figure 4 was modified y routing the gas inlet line through a flask of heated
water. By bubbling the gas through the water via a sparger an 86% RH was 2
attained in the chamber. The chamber pressu e as maintained at 1.87 kN/m (7.5
inches of water) at a gas flow of 1.57 x 10 m /s (2 cfh). The CGD output was
recorded as the RH within the chamber increased. The results of this test are
listed in Table 5.
There was an increase in CGD output as the chamber RH increased. This effect
was particularly noted over the RH range of 23 to 58%. From RlIs of 58% to 86%,
the CGD output remained essentially constant. Since the cabin RH specification
for the SSP is 36 to 77%, this test indicates that RH swings within specification
will create a 0.075 volt error in the CGD output. This corresponds to 0.06% H2.
Repeatability of CGD Readings. The repeatability of the CGD was defined by
exposing the CGD to a constant H -in-air mixture several times and recording the
CGD output. The readings of a perfectly repeatable instrument will duplicate
themselves when subjected to the same conditions time after time.
For this experiment the chamber pictured in Figure 4 was alternately filled with
1.98% H -in-air and N2 . The output of the CGD, when exposed to the H2/air
mixture, was recorded. For five trials with the 1.98% H -in-air, the following
readings were obtained: 2.50V, 2.40V, 2.55V, 2.45V, and 2.60V. The data indicate
that the CGD's repeatability is ±0.10V, or ±0.4%.
Speed of Response and Recovery Time
Speed of response was defined as the time required for the CGD to reach the
voltage output which corresponds to the H2-in-air mixture to which it is being
exposed. The recovery time is the time required for the CGD output to return to
its normal ambient reading after the H2/air supply has been removed. Ideally,
the CGDs should respond as rapidly as possible to the initial presence of H2 and
to subsequent changes in H2 concentration.
In order to characterize speed of response of the CGDs, a sensor was mounted in
ambient air and a H2 leak source at 0.5 ipm was simulated 5.1 cm (2 in) below
the sensor head. Sensor output as a function of time was recorded. The time
period started when the valve turning on H2 flow was opened. The speed of
response was then defined as the time required for the CGD output to reach a
peak. The leaking gas was shut off and the recovery time was measured. The
recorder data for this test are presented in Figure 10. Response time was 6
seconds and recovery time was 12 seconds.
This technique was chosen because it best represented the maximum response that
would be obtained if a H2 leak occurred at a CS-6 component. It should be noted
that response time is very dependent on the method used to determine it and
before comparing these data to response times reported by other investigators
one should consider the differences in the techniques used to determine the
response times. The 6-second response time is considered adequate for this
application -
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TABLE 5 CGD OUTPUT VERSUS RELATIVE HUMIDITY
OF H2/AIR MIXTURE
Relative Humidity, Sensor Output,
Percent Volt
23 2.405
29 2.400
37 2.425
42 2.440
47 2.460
52 2.485
58 2.500
63 2.515
70 2.510
80 2.505
86 2.505
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Interchangeability of CGDs
The SSP Item No. 178 CGDs consist of a sensing head and an electronic controller
as pictured in Figure 3. As seen in Figures 1 and 2, the sensor heads are
mounted remotely from their corresponding electronic controllers. Maintenance
of the CGDs requires removal of two components from two different locations. In
order to facilitate maintenance it was decided to determine if the CGD sensor
heads and controllers are interchangeable without requiring a calibration
procedure.
Two CGDs, 178-01 and 178-02, were placed in the test chamber (Figure 4) and the
chamber was filled with N2 gas. The sensor readings in N2 were 0.006 and 0.007
volts, respectively. The sensors were interchanged, e.g., sensor head 178-01
was connected to the controller for 178-02 and vice versa. The readings obtained
in this configuration were 0.745 for 178-01 sensor head and 178-02 controller
and -0.895 volts for 178-02 sensor head and 178-01 controller. This result
points out that the CGD sensor heads and controllers cannot be interchanged
without requiring recalibration.
Ability to Detect Leaks on the CS-6
Several experiments were performed to determine if the CGDs as located on the
CS-6 are effective in sensing H2 leaks from the CS-6 H 2 LRUs. These experiments
involved:
1. Recording CGD output as a function of H2 leak rate at the H2 LRUs.
2. Recording CGD output as a function of the H concentration of the
leaking gas. The gas mixtures used were H2 C02'
3. Determining the effect of an air draft across the H2 LRUs on CGD
output while H2 is leaking at a given flow rate from specific LRUs.
Variation of H2 Leak Rate
------- :-:2--
A task was performed to establish effectiveness of the CGDs in sensing H leaks
from various LRUs on the CS-6. Leaks were simulated at various CS-6 H2 RUs and
the output of the CGDs were recorded. The leaks were allowed to continue for
two minutes or until the CGD outputs stabilized, whichever was longer. Figures
11 and 12 graphically show the results of this task. The horizontal line at
0.625 volts represents the SSP shutdown point as defined in the 12 SSP H2leakage rules (Table 1). This corresponds to 0.5% H2-in-air.
Table 6 was constructed utilizing the data in Figures 11 and 12. The table
shows that for the distribution of CGDs and thE shutdown level (0.625 volts)
selected for the CS-6, a leak of 1.67 x 10 m /s (1.0 1/min) at LRUs 306-37,
306-38, 306-39, and 310-32 would have to occug bfore the CS-6 would be shut
down. The table also shows that a 1.67 x 10 m _s 1.0, /min) leak at LRU 877-
31 would not cause shutdown and that a 0.42 x 10 m /s (0.25 I/min) leak at all
components except LRU 882-31 would not cause subsystem shutdown. The minimum H2
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TABLE 6 CS-6 HYDROGEN LEAK SHUTDOWNS
Leak Source, H,2 Leak Rate, Lpm
CS-6 LRU 0.25 0.5 1.0
306-30 x(a)  X
306-37 X
306-38 X
306-39 X
882-31. X X X
882-32 X X
877-31
310-32 X
(a) X - indicates that the listed flow rate at the given CS-6
LRU will be sensed and the subsystem would be shut down
by the ACE/IMS. This is based on 0.625 volt or 0.5%
H2-in-air shutdown.
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detection level as defined in the 12 SSP H leakage rules corresponds to 0.2%
H2-in-air. Rule 7, Table 1, specifies tha the CGDs should give notice to the
crew at 0.2% H2 concentration. The broken horizontal line (0.25 volt) on Figures
11 and 12 represent this concetation of H2-in-air. Observation of Figures 11
and5123show that a 0.84 x 10 m /s (0.5 1/min) leak at LRU 877-31 and 0.42 x
10 m /s (0.25 1/min) leak at 882-32, 306-38, 310-32, and 877-31 would go
completely undetected.
Variation in H2/C 2O Concentration
Since the H exhaust of the EDC is a mixture of H2 and CO , it was important to
establish t~e effect of leaking H2/CO mixtures on CGD ouput. To accomplish
this, H2/CO2 leaks at various LRUs were simulated and the outputs of CGys 178-01
and 178-02 were recorded. The leak rates were maintained at 0.84 x 10 m /s
(0.5 1/min) and the leaks were continued for two minutes or until the CGD readings
peaked, whichever was greater. The results of this test are presented in Figures
13 and 14. The graphs indicate that the CGDs are !less sensitive to gas leaks
downstream of the electrochemical modules in the EDC because this gas is diluted
with CO . This result was expected since the CGD reacts only to the H2 component
of the /CO mixture and, as the percentage of H2 in the H2/CO2 mixture decreases,
the amount oi H2 in the location of the CGD decreases.
Effect of Air Draft on CGD Operation
For this test a blower was set up with a variable transformer so that its speed
and resulting air velocity could be varied. Using the blower, a draft was
created across the H2 components on the rear panel of the CS-6. The air velocity
of this draft was measured by a Dwyer No. 460 air meter.
Leaks of 1.67 x 10-5 m3/s (1.0 1/min) H2 were simulated at H2 LRUs 306-30 and
882-31 and CGD output was recorded at various air speeds for CGDs 178-01 and
178-02 on the back of the CS-6. The results of this test are presented in
Figures 15 and 16. The data illustrate how air movement alters the normal
diffusion path of H2 leaks and, in this case, blows the H2 away from the CS-6
before the CGDs are capable of completely detecting the leak.
Figure 15 shows thatas the air5spied past the H components increases from 0 to
1000 ft/min, given a 1.67 x 10 m /s (1.0 1/min leak rate at LRU 306-30,
sensor 178-01 readings will decrease approximately 2.0 volts, corresponding to
1.6% H . This represents a very serious safety problem as gross H2 leaks could
go undetected as a result of air drafts past the subsystem.
Improvements Desirable for EC/LSS H2 Detection Concept
As a result of this study, several areas for improvement in H2 detection for
future EC/LSSs were identified.
Triple Redundant CGDs
In the interest of safety it would be desirable to have triple redundant CGDs.
With the current concept the CGDs on the EDC cannot be fault isolated. There is
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no way of knowing that a CGD has failed. This represents a safety problem for
the fail low failure mode as potential leaks would go undetected. In the case
of the fail high failure mode, unnecessary subsystem shutdown (false alarm) and
needless leak location efforts would result. Repeated false alarms due to the
fail high failure mode may result in the crew tending to ignore the alarm,
thereby creating a potential safety hazard.
The current philosophy and configuration violate two basic SSP rules: first,
fault detection and fault isolation of a failed CGD is not possible and, second,
system safety with regard to detecting leaks from all H2 components is not
possible if a CGD has failed low. Development and incorporation of triply re-
dundant CGDs will improve the safety and reliability of EC/LSS with regard to
detecting H2 leaks.
In situ Calibration
This study revealed that the CGDs selected for the SSP exhibited poor long-term
reproducibility. This study pointed out the need for frequent CGD calibrations.
The calibration procedure recommended for SSP application involved removing the
CGD sensor head and electronics package from the subsystem. The CGD sensor head
is inserted in a calibration chamber with a known concentration of H2 and the
CGD is adjusted to give the correct reading. Since the maintenance activities
involved in removing the CGDs from the subsystem are tedious, requiring removal
of two units, and since the CGDs are position-sensitive, a method of in situ
calibration would be desirable.
With regard to position sensitivity the calibration performed on the CGDs would
be correct only if thelCGD sensor heads are mounted in the same orientation as
they were in the calibration chamber. A method for performing in situ CGD
calibrations would improve the maintainability, accuracy, and safety of the
CGDs.
Maintenance
It would be desirable from a maintainability point of view if the CGD consisted
only of one package. The SSP CGD, Item No. 178, consists of a sensor head and a
remote electronics package (see Figure 3). The maintenance time involved in
removing the CGD from the subsystem could be reduced by one-half if the CGD were
designed as a single package.
Location of CGDs
The previous section of this report points out that the CGDs as located on the
EDC are not capable of detecting leaks from all H components (Table 6). The
reliability of and safety provided by the SSP H2 detection concept could be
improved if more sensors were strategically located on the EDC. The strategy
for sensor location and the quantity required should be determined by evaluating
the H2 leak profife from all the H2 LRUs in the operating environment (zero g,
air drafts, etc.). 2
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Combustible Gas Detector
Identification and incorporation of a CGD whose output is independent of its
orientation, whose long-term reproducibility is better than ±0.10% Il,-in-air for
periods greater than two months, whose output is not affected by variations in
input power and whose output is linear over the entire H1 concentration range
would improve the reliability of and safety afforded by the CGDs.
Alternate Combustible Gas Detection Approaches for EC/LSS
A study was carried out to identify alternate combustible gas detection approaches.
Several concepts were proposed. The five most practical concepts for incorpora-
tion into EC/LSS subsystems were selected for comparison:
1. Subsystem Enclosure with Air Flow
Enclose each subsystem and blow air through the enclosure. Monitor
the exit air duct for presence of H12
2. H2 LRU Enclosure
-
Monitor the H2 concentration of an enclosure that.contains all the
CS-6 H2 LRUs.
3. H 2 LRU Enclosure with N Blanket
--2 27
Monitor the H2 concentration of an enclosure that contains all the
CS-6 H2 LRUs. Maintain a positive N2 pressure in this enclosure A
noncatalytic detector is required.
4. Subsystem Air Sampling
Draw air samples from various points on the CS-6 and monitor these for
H2 concentration.
5. Extensive CGD Coverage
Increase the number of CGDs on the CS-6 so that all possible leak
sources are monitored.
These concepts were evaluated with regard to their power penalty, weight, volume,
cost, reliability, and maintainability. The results of this comparison are
presented in Table 7. The data presented in the table are based on best judgment
knowing current state-of-the-art SSP practices. The first five features in the
table are self-explanatory. The reliability was defined by listing the addition
or reduction in the expected failures of the subsystem that would occur if the
proposed concept were adopted. This was obtained by multiplying the sum of the
failure rates of all additional components by the mission time (4320 hours).
Maintainability was-defined by estimating the time required to maintain any
additional components and by adding this to an estimate of the additional time
required to maintain all other components because of incorporating the proposed
34
TABLE 7 COMPARISON OF PROPOSED H2 DETECTION CONCEPTS
Concept 1 2 3 4 5
H2 LRUs Enclosure Subsystem Air Extensive CGD
Features Compared Subsystem Enclosure H2 LRUs Enclosure with N2 Blanket Sampling Coverage
Additional Compon- Subsystem Enclosure, H2 LRU Enclosure H LRU Enclosure Sample Pump 12 Additional
ents Required Air Blower, Blower Motor-Driven Valve CGD Gas Chamber CGDs, Instru-
Speed Sensor, Air Pressure Regulator Sample Tubing mentation for
Flow Sensor Pressure Transducer Multiplexing
Signals
Power Penalty 30W OW 4W and 58W while 25W 35W
Motor-Driven Valve
is running
Weight Added 33.5 Lb 4.5 Lb 10.0 Lb 9.5 Lb 47.0 Lb
Volume Added 0.10 Ft3  0.05 Ft3  0.09 Ft3  0.08 Ft3  0.53 Ft3
Additional Cost $8,500 $3,500 $5,400 $2,500 $14,000
Reliability Penalty 0.066 0 0.061 0.065 0.259
(Expected Addi-
tional Failure for
Six Month Mission)
Maintainability 49 Min 17 Min 35 Min 20 Min 72 Min
Penalty
Safety 90 80 95 40 50
Ease of Fair Good Good Good Poor
Calibration
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concept. For example, Concept 1 incorporates two additional components and a
subsystem enclosure.' The maintainability penalty equals the sum of the time to
maintain the additional components plus the additional time to maintain all
components within the enclosure because of having to remove the access panel.
The safety was given a relative value from 0 to 100 based on a review board
assessment of the probability that the given concept would detect all possible
H2 leaks and result in subsystem shutdown before the combustible limit of H -in-
air is reached. The following paragraphs describe each proposed concept an
provide justification for the data presented in Table 7.
Subsystem Enclosure
In this concept, each subsystem would be enclosed with panels and an air flow
would be established through the subsystem enclosure. The required duct work
and blower would be added to the subsystem. Three CGDs would be mounted in the
exit duct and would monitor the combustible gas concentration of the air flowing
through the subsystem enclosure.. For this concept the CGDs would be triply
redundant and would command a subsystem and enclosure N2 purge when at least two
of the three CGDs indicate a H2 concentration in air at greater than 2%. Because
the H2 leak is confined and ignition sources removed from the enclosure and
because the CGDs are triply redundant, it is projected that subsystem shutdown
and N2 purge could be safely carried out when initiated at the 2% H -in-air
level. This would extend the shutdown point from 0.5% as required iy the SSP H2leakage rules (Table 1) and should eliminate unwarranted subsystem shutdowns.
Unlike the current SSP concept, it would ensure that leaks from all possible
leak sources are monitored; it is independent of variation in g (gravity or lack
of gravity) and it is not sensitive to normal cabin air movement. This concept
would require the addition of two components, an air circulation blower and air
flow sensor and the ductwork and paneling required to enclose the subsystem and
direct the air flow. It is conceivable that one blower could service the entire
EC/LSS as the exit from one subsystem could be connected to the inlet of the
next H2-bearing subsystem. Calibration of the CGDs would be facilitated if used
in this manner because a known quantity of H2 could be injected into the enclosure.
A disadvantage inherent with this technique is that subsystem maintenance would
become more difficult. Maintenance is compounded by the fact the enclosure
panels would have to be removed prior to actually starting work on the failed
LRU. A safety problem could occur if the blower forcing air through the enclosure
failed. Without air flow to move the air past the CGDs possible H leaks would
not be detected and would, if allowed to persist, reach the combustible limit of
H2-in-air. As a result, it would be necessary to add a blower speed sensor and
an air flow sensor to provide total subsystem safety.
H2 Component Enclosure
-2
For this concept, all the H2 components of the subsystem would be packaged
together and an enclosure would be constructed around them. The only H2-
bearing item in the subsystem not inside the enclosure would be the H2 inlet and
outlet tubing. Ideally, this would be continuous tubing with welded connections
and no fittings. Three CGDs would be mounted inside the enclosure and would
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monitor the combustible gas concentration. When the H 2-in-air concentration
reaches 2%, the subsystem would be shut down and the subsystem and H2 component
enclosure would be purged.
This concept would assure that leaks from all H2 leak sources are monitored. It
is not affected by gravity or normal cabin air movement. This concept would
require only the construction of an enclosure. Because the CGDs are mounted
within an enclosure, calibration would be simplified as calibration gases could
be admitted to this enclosure. It would not be necessary to remove the CGDs
from the unit. No additional components would be required for this concept. It
is anticipated that the enclosure purge could be accomplished by putting a "T"
fitting in the normal subsystem N purge line thereby utilizing the same motor-
driven valve for the N2 purge. Tis concept has two negative features. First,
from a packaging standpoint for some subsystems it may not be practical to
package all the H2 LRUs in one enclosure. Second, sincs the volume of the
enclosure would be relatively small (approximately 6 ft ), a large H2 leak could
result in a H2 concentration of greater than 4% in the enclosure before subsystem
shutdown occurs.
In order to minimize the latter problem, it would be necessary to set the H2
concentration shutdown and purge level such that the maximum possible H2 leak,
could not create a hazardous condition before shutdown and purge occur. With
this concept, the maintenance of the H2 LRUs would be more difficult because the
enclosure would have to be opened prior to beginning the LRU replacement.
H2 Component Enclosure with N2 Blanket
--22
This concept is an extension of the previous concept described, but in this case
the enclosure would be pressurized with N2 . This would provide an additional
margin of safety. Due to the lack of 0 , gross leaks could never result in an
explosive mixture within the enclosure iefore shutdown and purge occurs. This
concept would require utilizing CGDs that do not work on the catalytic combustion
principle.
Sensor principles acceptable for this concept are thermal conductivity and gas
chromatography. This concept would require an additional motor-driven valve and
pressure regulator to maintain the positive N2 pressure within the enclosure and
a pressure transducer to monitor the enclosure pressure. The additional main-
tenance and packaging difficulties inherent in the previous concept also apply
to this concept. Also, the calibration of the CGDs in this concept is facilitated
because they are mounted in an enclosure and therefore do not require removal
from the subsystem to perform calibration. Another safety plus could be achieved
if the N2 pressure in the chamber were maintained well above the H pressure of
the subsystem thereby making H leaks practically impossible. In his case, the
existence of leaks in the H plumbing could be determined indirectly by monitoring
the N2 pressure of the chamier or by monitoring N2 flow which would occur as a
N2 pressure regulator opens to allow N2 into the chamber to maintain pressure.
Air Sampling ihe Subsystem
For this concept sample ports would be located throughout the subsystem and air
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samples would be drawn to an enclosure which would contain three CGDs. The sub-
system would be shut down and purged when the triply redundant CGDs indicate H2
concentration greater than 2%. The improvements of this concept are that the
CGDs are truly triply redundant and insitu calibration would be easy to perform
as the CGDs would be mounted in a chamber and would not require removal from the
system. This approach to H2 detection would require one additional pump and
several sample ports with associated plumbing. The concept has the same problem
as the current concept; namely, a leak profile would have to be determined and
the sample ports would have to be mounted in areas where H2 leaks are most
likely to occur. The effects of gravity and normal cabin air movements will
influence the accuracy of this H2 detection approach. An additional negative
safety feature of this approach is that a combustible concentration can easily
be reached in the sample tubes due to their small volume.
Extensive CGD Coverage
For this concept, many CGDs would be mounted on the subsystem in locations
established by performing a H2 leak profile. As many as one CGD for each H LRU
may be required. For the sake of comparison in this report it was projected
that a total of 12 sensors would be adequate. The signal from the CGDs would be
multiplexed and subsystem shutdown and N purge would occur when any one CGD
indicates H2 concentration greater than %. This concept would require identi-
fication or development of a miniature CGD in order to be competitive with the
previous concept. This concept would facilitate leak location by observing
which sensors indicate the high H2 concentration. Although somewhat better than
the current SSP concept, this approach is not totally independent of gravity
variations and normal cabin air drafts. Because of the incorporation of a great
number of CGDs the calibration task would become quite extensive. Like the
current SSP approach this concept would not provide any sensor redundancy, and
there would be no method of determining whether or not a sensor is functioning
properly unless a small triply redundant sensor were developed.
CONCLUSIONS
From the results of the Combustible Gas Detector (CGD) evaluation program conducted,
the following conclusions have been drawn:
1. The CGDs, as configured on the Six-Man, Electrochemical Carbon Dioxide
Concentrator, were not capable of sensing H2 leaks from5all possible
leak sources. Even when the leaks reached a 1.57 x 10 m /s (1.0
1/min) rate, the CGDs did not sense H2 from all the leak sources
evaluated.
2. The response of the CGDs was affected by air currents. Because air
movement carried the leaking H2 away from the EDC, the CGDs became
less effective in detecting H2 leaks as the air movement in the
vicinity of the EDC increased. The impact on CGD output varied depend-
ing on leak rate, leak location, CGD location, and the air velocity.
For one.set of conditions the CGD output decreased by 2.0 volts (1.6%
H ) as the air speed increased from ambient conditions to 305 m/min
(1000 ft/min).
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3. The CGDs were found to be nonlinear over the 0 to 4% range of H2-in-
air concentration. The degree of nonlinearity was different for each
CGD evaluated.
4. The CGDs were position sensitive; their output varied by as much as
1.9 volts out of a 0 to 5 volt scale (equivalent to 1.52% H2-in-air)
when rotated 180 degrees about the axis of the sensor head and about
an axis perpendicular to the sensor axis and perpendicular to the g
vector.
5. The reproducibility of CGD readings was found to be poor; their readings
varied as a function of relative humidity (RH), input voltage to the
CGD electronic package, and exposure time to constant H2-in-air mixture.
As the RH increased from 23 to 86% RH the CGD output increased by 0.12
volts, a 4.6% variation. The effect of input voltage on CGD output
was different for both CGDs evaluated. The output voltage of the CGDs
decreased as the input voltage increased from 110 to 120 volts; one by
0.014 volts, the other by 0.046 volts. This represents a 15% and a
33% variation in output for the respective CGDs. After 25 days of
exposure to a constant H2/air mixture the CGD output decreased by 0.5
volts or by 20% compared to its initial reading.
6. The short-term repeatability, response time, and recovery time of the
CGDs when.evaluated in a controlled testing environment were found to
be acceptable.
7. Calibrations performed prior to launch will not be accurate when the
CGD is exposed to zero g due to the change in the thermal environment
which the sensor beads (sensing bead and reference bead) are exposed
to in zero g. Both the sensing head and the reference bead are heated
and they are not thermally insulated from each other. The CGD output
signal depends on the difference in temperature between the two beads.
Since convection currents are gravity dependent, the bead temperatures
and, more important, the difference in their temperatures will change,
producing a resultant change in the CGD output.
8. A H2 detection concept based on strategically locating CGDs in areas
where they are most likely to detect leaks is not an effective means
for monitoring all the possible H2 leak sources of a subsystem. The
diffusion characteristics of H2 will vary as the g forces vary from
the 1 g prior to launch to zero g in orbit. Attempts to locate the
CGDs based on leak profile data would require data at 1 g, 0 g and at
the g forces experienced between lift-off and orbit.
9. The CGD electronic package and sensor head are not interchangeable
without recalibration. Hence, insitu calibration is a necessity or
replacement of either component (sensor head or electronics) requires
the simultaneous removal and replacement of the other component.
10. As configured on the CS-6, the CGDs are not triply redundant. Failure
of any of the CGDs would result in a degraded safety condition, which
would be avoided if the CGDs were triply redundant.
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11. The CGDs on the EDC do not include instrumentation for fault isolation.
As a result there is no way of knowing that a CGD has failed low or
failed high. This represents a safety problem as potential leaks
could go undetected because of a failed low CGD or would lead to false
alarms if they failed high. False alarms would cause unnecessary
subsystem shutdowns and leakage location procedures. If false alarms
are frequent they may be ignored by the crew, thus creating a potential
hazard.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the results of this investigation, the following recommendations for
improving the safety and reliability of the H2 detection concept for subsystems
in EC/LSS are made:
i. Design, develop, fabricate, and test a triply redundant H2 sensor.
Major design emphasis should be on miniaturization. A goal would be
to package t e three Iensors (without electronics) in a volume of less
than 16.4 cm (1.0 in ). The electronics should include three sensor
voting logic to allow fault isolation of failed sensors and to provide
for improved safety and reliability of sensor output.
2. Design, develop, fabricate, and test CGD insitu calibration equipment
and demonstrate the procedure for performing the calibration. Major
design emphasis should be on quantifying the equipment required and
the complexity of the calibration function.
3. Define a flight experiment to establish the H2 leak profile from a
leak source in zero g and also to evaluate the triply redundant sensor
in zero g.
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